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Hi, I'm Martijn Vreugde this is a collection of my rambling thoughts on modern media, inspirational design and... well pretty much anything I found interesting enough to share with you fine upstanding folks of the internet.

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The Perfect Designer Workstation
Every designer has a workstation, whether it’s in the office or at home, designers tend to design their workstation in a specific way that will best suit themselves. There’s a saying that you can read a person’s attitude and personality by the look of the their workstation. High-res

The Perfect Designer Workstation

Every designer has a workstation, whether it’s in the office or at home, designers tend to design their workstation in a specific way that will best suit themselves. There’s a saying that you can read a person’s attitude and personality by the look of the their workstation.

A Guide To South Africa’s Economic Bubble

As Africa’s wealthiest major economy, South Africa has played a key symbolic role in the emerging markets boom that has transformed the global economy in the past decade. Unfortunately, like most other emerging economies now, South Africa is experiencing an economic bubble that shares many similarities to the bubbles that caused the downfall of Western economies in 2008. Though South Africa has received a significant amount of attention after its currency fell sharply in the past year, there is still very little awareness and understanding of the country’s economic bubble itself and its implications.

The emerging markets bubble began in 2009 after China embarked on an ambitious credit-driven, infrastructure-based growth plan to boost its economy during the Global Financial Crisis. China’s economy immediately rebounded due to the surge of construction activity, which drove a global raw materials boom that benefited commodities exporting countries such as Australia and emerging markets. Emerging markets’ improving fortunes attracted the attention of international investors who were looking to diversify away from the heavily-indebted Western economies that were at the heart of the financial crisis.

SA CAPETOWN 1

Cape Town, South Africa (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Record low interest rates in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, along with the U.S. Federal Reserve’s multi-trillion dollar quantitative easing programs, caused $4 trillion of speculative “hot money” to flow into emerging market investments over the last several years. A global carry trade arose in which investors borrowed cheaply from the U.S. and Japan, invested the funds in high-yielding emerging market assets, and earned the interest rate differential or spread. Soaring demand for emerging market investments led to a bond bubble and ultra-low borrowing costs, which resulted in government-driven infrastructure booms, dangerously rapid credit growth, and property bubbles in countless developing nations across the globe.

The emerging markets bond bubble helped to push South Africa’s 10-year government bond yield down to a record low of 5.77 percent after the global financial crisis:

south-africa-government-bond-yield

South Africa’s short-term interest rates were cut to all-time lows after the financial crisis as well, as the charts of the country’s benchmark interest rate, interbank interest rate, and bank lending (or prime overdraft) interest rate show:

south-africa-interest-rate

south-africa-interbank-rate

south-africa-bank-lending-rate

Why South Africa’s Growth Is Driven By A Credit Bubble

Low interest rate environments are known for inflating credit and asset bubbles, which is what has occurred in South Africa in the past decade. South Africa has experienced two low interest rate periods in the last ten years: the 2004 to 2006 period and the post-Crisis period, both of which led to rapid credit growth that exceeded the rate of economic growth.

Though South Africa’s real GDP grew by 38 percent in the past decade, private sector loans surged by approximately 225 percent. Since 2008, South Africa’s real GDP grew by 12.7 percent, while private sector loans have increased by nearly 45 percent:

south-africa-loans-to-private-sector

South Africa’s M3 money supply – a broad measure of total money and credit in the economy – paints a similar picture, with a 400 percent increase since 2004, and a 50 percent increase since 2008:

south-africa-money-supply-m3

(Of course, GDP growth to credit growth comparisons understate the severity of credit bubbles because credit is a primary driver of growth during economic bubbles.)

South Africa’s total outstanding external debt, or debt owed to foreign creditors, increased by 250 percent in the past ten years, and nearly 87 percent since 2008:

south-africa-external-debt

South Africa’s external debt now totals $136.6 billion or 38.2 percent of the country’s GDP – the highest level since the mid-1980s – due in large part to the emerging markets bond bubble that boosted foreign demand for the country’s bonds. South Africa’s external debt-to-GDP ratio was 25.1 percent just five years ago. $60.6 billion of South Africa’s external debt is denominated in foreign currencies, which exposes borrowers to the risk of rising debt burdens if the South African rand currency depreciates significantly, such as the currency’s 15 percent decline against the U.S. dollar in the past year. To make matters worse, over 150 percent worth of South Africa’s foreign exchange reserves are required to roll over its external debt that matures in 2014.

Unsecured loans, or consumer and small business loans that are not backed by assets, are the fastest growing segment of South Africa’s credit market and are essentially the country’s own version of subprime loans. Unsecured loans have grown at a 30 percentannual compounded rate since their introduction in 2007, when the National Credit Act was signed into law. Unsecured lending has become popular with banks because they are able to charge up to 31 annual interest rates, making these riskier loans far more profitable than mortgage and car loans in the low interest rate environment of the past half-decade. The unsecured credit bubble is estimated to have boosted South Africa’s GDP by 219 billion rand or U.S. $20.45 billion from 2009 to mid-2013.

Like U.S. subprime lenders from 2002 to 2006, South Africa’s unsecured lenders target working class borrowers who have limited financial literacy, which has contributed to the country’s growing household and personal debt problem.  A 2012/2013 report from the National Credit Regulator showed that South Africa’s 20 million citizens carried an alarming 1.44 trillion rand or U.S. $140 billion worth of personal debt – equivalent to 36.4 percent of the GDP. In addition, household debt now accounts for three-quarters of South Africans’ disposable incomes.

South Africa’s poorest borrowers have little choice but to rely on local loan sharks known as mashonisas (a Zulu word for ‘one who buries you under’), who commonly charge 30-60 percent annual interest rates. Rising indebtedness among South Africa’s poorest citizens was one of the primary reasons for the demands for better pay and strikes that led to the Marikana mine massacre in August 2012, when police officers killed 34 protesting miners.

Memorial service for Lonmin mine workers in Ma...

Memorial service for mine workers in Marikana, 23 Aug 2012 (Photo credit: GovernmentZA)

In 2013, the Anglican Church chastised UK-based lending company Wonga for aggressively promoting its 5,853 percent annual interest rate loans to poor South African borrowers. The church also launched its own not-for-profit credit unions in an attempt to put unscrupulous lenders like Wonga out of business.

How Low Interest Rates Fueled A Housing Boom

South Africa’s two low interest rate periods of the past decade, 2004-2006 and 2009-present, have led to sharp housing price gains as well as a longer-term property bubble. Housing prices rose at a 15 percent annual rate from 2000 to 2002 and began to dramatically accelerate starting in 2003 after interest rates were aggressively lowered. Housing prices proceeded to rise by 21 percent in 2003, 32 percent in 2004, 22 percent in 2005 and approximately 15 percent in 2006 and in 2007. The combination of rising interest rates and the Global Financial Crisis caused South Africa’s housing prices to dip slightly in 2008 and 2009, until interest rates were dropped to record lows, which has fueled another housing price boom since then.

According to the FNB House Price Index, South Africa’s housing prices rose by 145.2 percent in nominal terms and 42.6 percent in real terms from 2003 to 2013. Another housing price index published by The Economist magazine shows that South Africa’s housing prices increased by 193.5 percent in nominal terms and 67.6 in real terms from 2003 to 2013. South Africa’s housing prices rose by 10 percent in 2012 and 2013.

Here is the chart of the ABSA House Price Index since 2007:

Property Bubble

Note: I am not as much of a proponent of adjusting housing prices for inflation as most mainstream economists are because I believe that doing so understates the risk of housing bubbles due to the fact that housing and credit bubbles tend to be significant drivers of inflation in their own right.

South Africa’s housing price surge last decade was financed by a mortgage lending boom that was growing at a 30 percent annual rate at its peak in 2006, which caused household mortgage debt as a percentage of disposable income to rise from 27 percent to just under 50 percent from 2003 to 2010. In recent years, however, the rate of mortgage loan growth has slowed to under 5 percent, albeit growing on a much higher base.

South Africa’s housing boom of the past decade was predicated on ultra-low interest rates, which makes it vulnerable to rising interest rates. In addition, stagnant economic growth and heavily-indebted consumers are a significant headwind for South Africa’s housing market going forward.

The Financial Sector’s Role In The Bubble

Though South Africa is commonly thought to be a natural resources-based economy, mining and quarrying currently contribute only 5.1 percent to the country’s GDP, while finance, real estate and business services are the largest sector, accounting for 21.2 percent of the GDP. South Africa’s financial sector is unusually large compared to most developed countries, including the heavily financialized United States, where the financial sector’s share of the economy never rose above 10 percent, even at the finance bubble’s peak in 2007.

While most other sectors have declined in relative importance in the past two decades, South Africa’s financial sector’s share of the economy has continued to grow steadily, even through the Global Financial Crisis. The financial sector added 1.5 percentagepoints to South Africa’s growth in 2007 and 2008, and added 0.2 percentage points in 2009 despite a 1.5 percent overall GDP decrease that year. South Africa’s financial sector received a boost from the country’s low interest rates, rapid credit growth, and rising asset prices over the past decade.

South Africa’s property market isn’t the only market that has risen significantly; the country’s JSE stock average has nearly quintupled in value since 2003:

south-africa-stock-market

South Africa’s stock market boom began around the same time that interest rates were sharply reduced, as well as the start of the country’s property boom. South Africa’s stock market has been riding the global liquidity bubble that led to 1.2 trillion rand or nearly $112 billion (at the current exchange rate) in net capital inflows into the country’s financial markets since 2003. In just ten years, South Africa’s stock market capitalization-to-GDP ratio soared from 108.5 percent to 227 percent, dwarfing the U.S. stock market’s current 121 percent ratio (which is at a historically high level as well). The large size of South Africa’s financial sector and equity market makes the country’s economy particularly sensitive to financial market swings, both to the upside and the downside.

Companies in the basic materials sector such as BHP Billiton and Anglo American account for approximately one-quarter of the JSE stock average’s capitalization, which makes South Africa’s stock market vulnerable to the eventual ending of the global commodities supercycle that was driven by China’s economic bubble (a key tenet of my post-2009 bubble warning). Financial companies, which have thrived on the back of South Africa’s credit and asset bubble, make up 20 percent of the JSE stock average’s capitalization:

JSE

A Public Spending Boom Is Boosting The Economy

The previously discussed emerging markets bond bubble helped to lower the yields on South Africa’s government bonds, which reduced the government’s borrowing costs in turn. The government took advantage of this global monetary largess by borrowing and increasing its spending by nearly 50 percent in the past decade:

south-africa-government-spending

South Africa’s government began to run large budget deficits to boost the country’s economy after the Global Financial Crisis:

south-africa-government-budget

South Africa’s public spending boom caused the country’s government debt to GDP ratio to rise from 27.4 percent in 2009 to nearly 40 percent in 2013:

south-africa-government-debt-to-gdp

The bulk of South Africa’s public spending boom was allocated toward social services for the poor, including healthcare and education, as well as fiscal stimulus packages in the wake of the recession.

Why South Africa Is Addicted To “Hot Money”

Starting approximately a decade ago (when much of the country’s bubble started), South Africa began to run a persistent and worsening current account deficit that was financed by 1.2 trillion rand in net capital inflows from abroad:

south-africa-current-account

South Africa’s current account deficit to GDP ratio has risen to over 6 percent – a level that has led to currency crises in the past:

south-africa-current-account-to-gdp

South Africa’s reliance on foreign “hot money” to finance its current account deficit and to support its financial markets makes it unusually vulnerable to changes in foreign central banks’ monetary policies. When rumors of an upcoming tapering or downsizing of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s $85 billion per month QE3 program first surfaced in the spring of 2013, South Africa’s currency and bond markets took an immediate hit.

South Africa’s rand currency dropped by over 12 percent during its May 2013 rout and ended the year with an 18 percent loss, making it the worst performer among 16 major currencies:

Rand

The global emerging markets bond sell-off caused South Africa’s 10 year government bond yield to spike from 5.77 percent to nearly 9 percent within the past year:

south-africa-government-bond-yield

To add insult to injury, confidence in South Africa’s economy and financial markets was shaken by ongoing mine strikes and falling commodities prices, which threatened to exacerbate the country’s current account deficit.

I warned about the risks in South Africa and other emerging markets just a few months before the 2013 emerging markets panic in a report that I wrote when I was a contributor to Business Insider called “All The Money We’re Pouring Into Emerging Markets Has Created a Massive Bubble.”

South Africa’s turmoil led to its inclusion in a group of emerging economies that were nicknamed the “Fragile Five”, which also includes Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia, and India. The Fragile Five were hit the hardest of all emerging markets since the spring of 2013 because of their large current account and trade deficits, high inflation, significant dependence on foreign capital inflows, and slowing economic growth.

How South Africa’s Bubble Will Pop

In response to the rand’s decline, the South African Reserve Bank raised its benchmark interest rate 50 basis points to 5.5 percent in late-January 2014, which helped to pacify the country’s financial markets for the time being. Though not a drastic rate hike, the Reserve Bank’s move is a reason for concern because it may signal the beginning of the end of South Africa’s low interest rate environment that its economy and asset markets have become so reliant upon.

The key risk that South Africa faces is the further weakening of the rand currency and rising bonds yields as the Fed completes its QE3 tapering within the next year or so, leading to even more rate hikes, which would eventually pop the country’s credit and asset bubbles. The rand may also decline if difficulties arise as South Africa attempts to roll over its large amount of long-term external debt that matures this year.

Regardless of the specific path taken, rising global and local interest rates are what will ultimately pop South Africa’s bubble, whether it happens this year or in a few years from now. The popping of South Africa’s economic bubble is likely to coincide with the popping of the commodities bubble as well as the overall emerging markets bubble.

Though South Africa has received a significant amount of attention in recent months because of its weakening currency and its large current account deficit, virtually no attention has been given to the country’s credit and asset bubbles that are an even greater threat to the economy. I view this discrepancy as evidence of how little awareness there still is about South Africa’s economic bubble, which I hope to change with this report.

Here is what to expect when South Africa’s economic bubble pops:

  • The credit expansion will turn into a bust
  • Over-leveraged consumers will default on their debts
  • Banks will experience losses in their credit portfolios
  • Unemployment will rise
  • The economy will contract
  • Property, the rand currency, stock, and bond prices will fall, resulting in higher interest rates
  • The basic materials sector will experience pain as economically sensitive commodities fall in price; mine closures are likely

The popping of the overall emerging markets bubble will likely lead to a crisis that is worse than the 1997 Asian financial crisis due to the fact that more countries and regions are involved this time (Latin America, China, and Africa), and because the global economy is in a far more precarious state now than it was during the booming late-1990s.

Watergate pales in comparison to Nkandla

Nkandla is worse than Watergate; worse even than the Muldergate scandal of the apartheid era, which led to the demise of information minister Connie Mulder and eventually prime minister John Vorster.

Those were global landmarks of political notoriety. But now they have been surpassed by President Jacob Zuma’s Nkandlagate. It is more outrageous and despicable by far.

I say this because Watergate and Muldergate were about political skulduggery. The then American president Richard Nixon condoned the burglary at Washington’s Watergate Hotel to get his hands on his political opponents’ campaign plans ahead of an election. Mulder and his cohorts misused taxpayers’ money trying to buy journalists and whole newspapers to “tell the good story” of apartheid South Africa. They cheated and lied for political reasons.

Nkandlagate is about personal greed and moral shamelessness. It is about looting public money so that one man and his family can live in extravagant opulence for the rest of their lives — amid some of his people’s most abject poverty.

As Public Protector Thuli Madonsela’s report reveals, Zuma’s grandiose estate, set in R10m worth of landscape gardening covering the size of eight-and-a-half soccer pitches, is in an area populated by 114,416 of some of the country’s poorest people.

Around 40% of them are unemployed. Only 10,000 households have electricity, 7,000 have no access to piped water and 12,000 are still using pit latrines.

Where are those zealous young African National Congress (ANC) poo-throwers now?

Worst of all, though, is the fact that the ANC, its national executive committee and its Cabinet, are going to stand by this flawed leader. At least Nixon had the decency to resign over Watergate, as did Mulder and eventually Vorster.

That is what Zuma should do if he wants to save any honour for himself, his party and his country.

It would, of course, be a tough call for any ruling party to dump its leader just six weeks before a national election. But they could do so soon after May 7.

I hope so, because to cling to Zuma for another five years would be disastrous for the ANC. Nkandla is not going to go away, just as the arms deal scandal has not. Nor will the Guptagate affair. Zuma is tainted beyond redemption and if the ANC leadership decides to rally around him come hell or high water, all its ministers and other senior officials will have to keep obfuscating, lying and deceiving the public for the next five years, by which time they will themselves all be morally corrupted. Which would mean the disintegration of the party.

And let me say this. Critical though I have been of the ANC under the Zuma administration these past few years, it is obviously still the party of the majority of our black people, so its precipitous disintegration would be disastrous for South Africa.

I believe the ANC is on its way out, because it is strife-torn, has grown tired and is bereft of fresh ideas. But it will be a gradual, incremental decline that will ensure stability through the transition. A sudden disintegration could lead to chaos. I hope Zuma realises that and acts as he should.

Meanwhile, there is the question of whether Zuma lied to Parliament — which is an impeachable offence — when he told the National Assembly that he and his family had built their own Nkandla homes and that the state had not built any or benefited them. As Madonsela has found, this was not true.

But she declined to make a finding on the question of lying because, she says, Zuma claims he was thinking only about the houses, not the array of other structures that had been added at state expense, such as a visitors centre, a cattle kraal, chicken run, swimming pool, an amphitheatre and a string of other expensive amenities. It may, she says, have been “a bona fide mistake”.

After a close reading of Madonsela’s lengthy and meticulously detailed report, I think that was a generous decision.

The core fault in the Nkandla affair is that it was undertaken as a “cost-shared project”. Before he became president, Zuma decided to upgrade his private home in rural KwaZulu-Natal, which at the time consisted of a few rondavels surrounded by a ramshackle fence. He took out a bond, engaged an architect and a quantity surveyor, and work began on building three new homes the architect designed for him.

After becoming president, standing rules required that this property be provided with prescribed security facilities. The work had to be supervised by police and defence force units and paid for by the state. But at the president’s insistence, his private architect, Manenhle Makhanya, was appointed as the architect and principal agent for the whole project; in other words, the man who was the on-the-ground boss of the whole enterprise — without the job having been put out to tender, as required, and without a thought being given to the obvious conflict of interests that might be involved.

Here was the president’s private architect in control of a project in which costs had to be shared between Zuma, as his primary employer, and the state. With everyone else involved eager to please Number One, the door was obviously wide open for costs to be slipped from one account to the other.

Thus, a “safe haven” for the president required by the regulations, which could have been built inside the main house for R500,000, ballooned into an elaborate underground bunker accessible by special lifts from all three of the houses with a secret exit at a total cost of R14m.

Similar escalations happened across the board resulting, in Madonsela’s words, “in substantial value being unduly added to the president’s private property”. Even allowing for the bona fide mistake, can anyone believe Zuma was unaware of this?

That is how the costs of a project initially estimated at R27m swelled to R246m. That is a tenfold, or 1,000%, overrun. Madonsela has described it as “unconscionable”. Yet no one directly involved in the project asked any questions. Madonsela has excoriated them, including some ministers and whole organs of state, saying they “failed dismally” and finds some guilty of unlawful and improper conduct and maladministration.

But what about the president? He was Number One in this project, officially referred to as “the principal”.

He received many reports, was kept informed by his architect, paid several visits to the work site, even issued instructions about changes he wanted to be made.

It is inconceivable that he never noticed the whole project was going over the top to such an extravagant and highly visible degree.

Madonsela seems to think so too. She says there is no evidence he ever asked about costs. “It is my considered view,” she says, “that he tacitly accepted the implementation of all measures at his residence and has unduly benefited from the enormous capital investment from the nonsecurity installations at his private residence.”

This failure to act was a serious breach of the Executive Ethics Code and amounted to “conduct that is inconsistent with his office as a member of the Cabinet”.

Quite clearly Zuma didn’t want to know. In his world, there is a notice on his desk saying: “The buck bypasses here.”

BY ALLISTER SPARKS 

• Allister Sparks was editor of the Rand Daily Mail when it exposed the Muldergate scandal.

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